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INTRODUCTION

A. Facts
1

On August 10, 2000, Todd Urban, thirty-four, and his wife
Barbara Ann, thirty-eight, were driving south on Highway 52 in
Goodhue County, Minnesota with their young children, five-year
2
old Marcus and two-year old twins Michael and Brett. The Urbans
were traveling to Janesville, Wisconsin to leave their children with
Todd’s parents while Todd and Barbara went to a softball
3
tournament for the weekend.
At the same time, Orvin Rolland, eighty-four, who had been
drinking at the American Legion Post in Pine Island, Minnesota,
4
was driving north in the southbound lane of Highway 52. Rolland
drove the wrong way down the highway for at least a few miles;
other drivers used cell phones to report the problem to the State
5
Patrol. Unfortunately, state troopers did not respond quickly
6
enough.
Todd Urban was following another vehicle in the southbound
lane of the highway. The other vehicle swerved to avoid Rolland’s
7
car, and Todd collided head-on with Rolland. The collision killed
8
Barbara and Rolland. Todd suffered a crushed right leg, a broken
9
left wrist, and a dislocated right shoulder. Marcus was paralyzed
10
from the chest down. Brett was left in a coma and needed to have
1. Urban v. Am. Legion Dep’t of Minn., 723 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 2006); John
Weiss, 2 Die in Head-on Crash on U.S. 52, THE ROCHESTER POST-BULL. (Minn.), Aug.
11, 2000, available at http://www.duipictures.com/barbara.htm. The court of
appeals incorrectly listed the date of the accident as August 10, 2004. Urban v.
Am. Legion Post 184, 695 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d, 723
N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2006).
2. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 2.
3. Wrong-Way Driver Shatters the Lives of a Young Family, THE ROCHESTER POSTBULL. (Minn.), Sept. 14, 2000, available at http://www.duipictures.com/barbara.
htm [hereinafter Wrong-Way Driver].
4. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 2–3; Wrong-Way Driver, supra note 3. This was the
second head-on collision caused by a vehicle driving the wrong way on Highway 52
in that area in the previous five months. Wrong-Way Driver, supra note 3.
5. Weiss, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Coroner Rules Driver in Fatal Crash Was Drunk, THE ROCHESTER POST-BULL.
(Minn.), Sept. 5, 2000, available at http://www.duipictures.com/barbara.htm
[hereinafter Coroner].
8. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 3; Coroner, supra note 7.
9. Wrong Way Driver, supra note 3.
10. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss4/7

2

Mann: Torts: Respondeat Superior and the CDA: Letting the Superior Off
9. MANN - ADC

2008]

6/11/2008 6:03:34 PM

URBAN V. AMERICAN LEGION

1491

11

part of his brain and skull removed. Michael suffered only minor
injuries and was released from the hospital shortly after the
12
accident.
The accident was reported to the State Patrol at 5:02 in the
13
evening. The police found alcohol in Rolland’s car at the scene
14
of the accident.
The coroner later ruled that “acute alcohol
15
The
intoxication” was a significant factor in Rolland’s death.
death certificate does not reveal Rolland’s exact blood-alcohol
level, but the diagnosis of acute alcohol intoxication indicates his
16
blood-alcohol concentration was at least 0.10 percent.
B. Background
In Latin, respondeat superior means “let the superior make
17
answer.”
Respondeat superior is a common-law doctrine of
vicarious liability that imposes liability “on the master who is not
18
directly at fault.” In Urban, the Minnesota Supreme Court had to
determine whether respondeat superior applied to actions brought
19
under the Minnesota Civil Damages Act (CDA). When an injury
results from the acts of an intoxicated person who has been illegally
sold alcohol, the CDA allows the injured victim to bring suit against
20
the culpable vendor. The CDA created a new statutory “cause of
21
action that did not exist at common law.”
A statute creating a new cause of action abolishes the common
22
Therefore,
law only by “by express wording or implication.”
unless statutory provisions instruct otherwise, common-law
23
principles remain for the court to interpret.

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Weiss, supra note 1.
14. Id.
15. Coroner, supra note 7.
16. Id.
17. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1338 (8th ed. 2004).
18. See Lange v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 403, 211 N.W.2d 783, 785
(1973) (defining respondeat superior and explaining its policy considerations).
19. MINN. STAT. §§ 340A.801–.802 (2004). See Urban v. Am. Legion Dep’t of
Minn., 723 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2006).
20. § 340A.801, subdiv. 1.
21. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 5.
22. Id. (quoting Shaw Acquisition Co. v. Bank of Elk River, 639 N.W.2d 837,
877 (Minn. 2002)).
23. See Shaw, 639 N.W.2d at 877.
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The question remains—under what circumstances can a
statute be interpreted to abrogate common law? Courts have used
many methods of analysis to arrive at this answer, including
employing the rule that the CDA must be “strictly construed in the
24
sense that it cannot be enlarged beyond its definite scope.” But, it
is often difficult for courts to determine what the legislature
intended the scope of a statute to be. When legislative intent
cannot easily be gleaned from the words of a statute, courts employ
specific methods of statutory construction. “These rules are said to
enable interpreters to draw inferences from the language, format,
25
and subject matter of the statute.” Unfortunately, most methods
of statutory construction are highly criticized because for every
26
canon that might apply, there is an equal and opposite canon.
Therefore, the rules often do nothing more than “describ[e]
27
28
results reached by other means,” such as in Urban.
This note first explores the historical development of dram
shop acts, specifically the CDA and common-law doctrines of
29
vicarious liability and respondeat superior. It then discusses the
30
supreme court’s analysis of Urban and analyzes the court’s
31
holding. This note ultimately concludes that the court’s decision
in Urban is incorrect and does not serve the intended purposes of
32
the CDA.
II. HISTORY
A. Alcohol Regulation
In the two hundred years after Jamestown, Virginia was
founded in 1607, there were a few pre-Prohibition attempts to limit

24. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 6 (quoting Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 34, 70
N.W.2d 886, 891 (1955)).
25. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 818 (3d ed. 2001).
26. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950).
27. REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 234
(1975).
28. See Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 12–13.
29. See infra Part II.
30. See infra Part III.
31. See infra Part IV.
32. See infra Part V.
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33

alcohol use. Government attempts focused on preventing alcohol
use by groups likely to organize against the government,
34
particularly Native Americans. Louis XIV of France prohibited
35
the sale of liquor in New France in 1681. Alexander Hamilton
recommended high liquor taxes to raise revenue after the adoption
36
of the Constitution, but his proposal was not adopted.
At the local government level, colonists’ alcohol regulations
were measures “to outlaw drunkenness, not to reform social
37
customs.” Because state and local governments felt responsibility
toward drunken society members, who were viewed as lacking selfcontrol, strict rules governing tavern owner and patron behavior
38
were enacted. Actions taken by various religious groups providing
guidelines or regulations for alcohol use also “played a key role in
39
the evolution of Prohibition.” By the early nineteenth century,
Americans’ increasing concern with moral standards led to the
40
emergence of societies aimed at reforming morals. This led to
the first anti-alcohol society comprised of men in high social
41
standing, in 1813. During the mid-1800s, a prohibitionist group
42
called the American Temperance Society grew in influence. As a
result, temperance societies became more prevalent, and
43
temperance “became a popular intellectual movement.”
33. FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., DRINKERS, DRIVERS, AND BARTENDERS: BALANCING
PRIVATE CHOICES AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 25 (2000).
34. Id.
35. Id. New France included the territory that later became Michigan,
Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. Id.
36. Id. at 26.
37. Id. The goals of tavern restrictions were: (1) to prevent personal excess
and public disorder; (2) to protect against Native Americans under the influence;
(3) to provide accommodations in taverns for travelers without exposing them to
drunkenness and disorder; (4) to recognize the economic importance of the
brewing and distilling industries; and (5) to raise revenue through liquor taxation.
Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 27. The Methodist church began the movement in 1753 by
enacting disciplinary recommendations for members who drank. Id. In 1787, the
Quakers declared that members should not deal in liquor. Id. At a Presbyterian
convention in Philadelphia in 1812, members agreed to alcohol restrictions. Id.
The Methodist General Conference advised its members to discontinue the sale
and manufacture of alcohol. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 27–28.
42. Id. at 28.
43. Id. at 29. In 1828, there were 1000 temperance societies with 100,000
members. Id. In 1831, the number had increased to 2200 societies with 170,000
members. Id. By 1832, 4000 societies had emerged with 500,000 members. Id.
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B. Dram Shop Acts
1.

Background

Under the common law, servers or suppliers of alcohol were
not held liable for injuries inflicted on third parties as a result of
44
alcohol consumption. The rationale for this rule was that drinking
45
was the proximate cause of intoxication, not the serving of
46
alcohol. “[E]ven if a vendor breached a duty to those injured by
an intoxicated person, the vendor was not legally liable” because
the chain of causation between the vendor’s negligent serving and
the patron’s injury was held to be severed by the voluntary act of
47
drinking the alcohol.
Departing from the common-law rule, many states began to
48
enact civil damage or “dram shop” statutes that imposed strict
49
liability on vendors for injuries caused by intoxicated patrons.
Wisconsin enacted the first of these statutes in 1849. It required
that tavern owners post a bond to cover the expenses of
prosecutions arising from alcohol related accidents and the
support of poor people, widows, and orphans injured by a patron’s
50
excessive consumption. Indiana passed the prototype of today’s
51
dram shop statute in 1853. Eleven states had enacted statutes by
52
the mid-1870s.
Amherst, Dartmouth, Brown, Middlebury, Yale, Union, Kenyon, and Oberlin had
college temperance organizations as part of the intellectual temperance
movement. Id.
44. Id. at 115, 118.
45. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 234 (8th ed. 2004) (defining proximate cause
as “cause that is legally sufficient to result in liability; an act or omission that is
considered in law to result in a consequence, so that liability can be imposed on
the actor”).
46. SLOAN, supra note 33, at 118.
47. Id.
48. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 531 (8th ed. 2004) (defining dram shop as
“[a] place where alcoholic beverages are sold; a bar or saloon”).
49. James R. Myers, Dramshop Liability: The Blurry Status of Drinking Companions,
34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1153, 1156 (1990) (discussing the historical background of
dram shop liability).
50. Id. See also Act of February 8, 1850, ch. 139 § 1, 1850 Wis. Sess. Laws 109;
SLOAN, supra note 33, at 118.
51. SLOAN, supra note 33, at 118. The statute stated:
Any wife, child, parent, guardian, employer or other person who shall be
injured in person, or property, or means of support, by any intoxicated
person . . . shall have the right of action in his or her own name against
any person . . . who shall, by retailing spirituous liquor, have caused the
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Upon the repeal of Prohibition, states stopped enacting dram
shop statutes. After World War II, pressure from bars and taverns
53
convinced state legislatures to repeal their existing statutes. Since
the 1970s, however, many states have enacted new dram shop
54
statutes. In other states, liability for dram shops has been imposed
55
through modern common law.
Arkansas, Delaware, Kansas,
Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, and Virginia do not recognize dram
56
shop liability.
2.

Minnesota

The predecessor to Minnesota’s dram shop act was passed by
57
the first Minnesota legislature, which convened in 1858. In 1911,
Minnesota adopted four separate alcohol related statutes, one of
which was the Civil Damages Act, now codified at section 340A.801
58
of Minnesota Statutes. Before the enactment of the CDA, those
injured by intoxicated persons had no cause of action against
vendors of alcohol because there was no cause of action at common
59
law. Originally, the adoption of dram shop statutes in Minnesota
and elsewhere was mostly accomplished as a result of restrictions

intoxication of such person for any and all such damages sustained and
for exemplary damages.
Id. (citing Act of March 4, 1853, § 10, 1853 Ind. Acts 87).
52. Id. These states were Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have
statutory dram shop liability provisions. Id. at 116–17 (listing liability by state as of
1998).
55. Id. at 118. Arizona, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Indiana,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wyoming enforce common law dram shop liability. Id. at 116–17.
56. Id. at 116–17.
57. Lindsay G. Arthur, Jr., Minnesota Liquor Liability Law, ADVANCED LEGAL
EDUC. § 1.2, at 5 (1983). The legislation made it necessary for those selling
intoxicating beverages to obtain a license and post a bond in the penal sum of
$1000 for malt liquors. Id.
58. MINN. STAT. § 340A.801 (2004); Arthur, supra note 57, § 1.2, at 6.
59. Strand v. Vill. of Watson, 245 Minn. 414, 419, 72 N.W.2d 609, 614 (1955);
Arthur, supra note 57, § 1.2, at 6.
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60

on alcohol consumption. The adoption was a method to control
61
liquor traffic, not to compensate injured persons. Historically, the
Minnesota Supreme Court considered the CDA as “highly penal in
its nature . . . [and] . . . to be strictly construed in the sense that it
62
[could not] be enlarged beyond its definite scope . . . .” Recently,
however, the court has applied the CDA’s remedial purposes more
63
liberally.
Minnesota’s dram shop law applies only to commercial
64
vendors of alcoholic beverages and not to social hosts.
Under the current version of the Minnesota Civil Damages
Act, a plaintiff must satisfy five elements to establish liability against
a Minnesota liquor vendor:
(1)

An illegal sale of intoxicating liquor;

(2)

The illegal sale caused or contributed to the
allegedly
intoxicated
person’s
(AIP)
intoxication;

(3)

The AIP’s intoxication was a direct cause of the
plaintiff’s injury;

(4)

The plaintiff sustained damages recoverable
under the Civil Damages Act; and

(5)

Proper notice must be provided to the liquor
65
vendor pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 340A.802.

60. Arthur, supra note 57, § 1.2, at 6.
61. Id. For example, the primary consequence of making an illegal sale of
alcohol under Minnesota’s first Dram Shop Act was loss of license, and liability to
those injured was limited to $1000. Id. (citing 1858 Minn. Laws at ch. 124).
62. Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 34, 70 N.W.2d 886, 891 (1955).
63. Arthur, supra note 57, § 1.2, at 7. For example, the court stated “[t]he
civil damage act is both penal and remedial, an inconsistency which we have
recognized but resolved in favor of a liberal construction to suppress the mischief
and advance the remedy.” Id. (citing Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 120, 200 N.W.2d
149, 152 (1972)).
64. Byron M. Peterson et al., Minnesota Liquor Liability, MINN. INST. LEGAL
EDUC., § 1, at 2 (1999).
65. Id. § 1, at 2–3.
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The first element, an illegal sale, can happen in a number of
66
ways: (1) sale to an obviously intoxicated person; (2) sale to an
67
68
underage drinker; (3) sale to a non-member of a club; (4) sale
69
70
after hours; (5) sale on a prohibited day; or (6) an on-sale
71
alcoholic beverage is consumed off premises. Second, a plaintiff
must prove that the illegal sale caused or contributed to the
72
intoxication.
The illegal sale need not be the sole cause of
73
“[T]he surrounding circumstances must show ‘a
intoxication.
practical and substantial relationship’ between the illegal sale and
74
intoxication.”
The plaintiff must also prove that the AIP’s
75
intoxication was a direct (proximate) cause of plaintiff’s injuries.
C.

Vicarious Liability

Typically, liability under tort law in the United States is based
76
on fault. But in some cases a supervisory party bears liability for
“the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate . . . based on
77
the relationship between the two parties.” This doctrine is known
as vicarious liability.
Around 1700, the rule of vicarious liability first appeared in
England’s common law through a series of judicial opinions,
78
mainly authored by Justice Holt. The new rule was rejected by the
66. Id. § 1, at 4.
67. Id. § 1, at 6.
68. Id. § 1, at 8.
69. Id.
70. Id. § 1, at 9.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Hollerich v. City of Good Thunder, 340 N.W.2d 665, 668 (Minn. 1983)
(quoting Kvanli v. Vill. of Watson, 272 Minn. 481, 484, 139 N.W.2d 275, 277
(1965)).
75. Peterson, supra note 64, § 1, at 10.
76. Daniel J. Koevary, Automobile Leasing and the Vicarious Liability of Lessors, 32
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 655, 663 (2005).
77. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 934 (8th ed. 2004).
78. Hern v. Nichols, 91 Eng. Rep. 256 (1709); Lane v. Cotton, 88 Eng. Rep.
853 (1701); Tuberville v. Stampe, 91 Eng. Rep. 1072 (1697); Boson v. Sandford, 87
Eng. Rep. 212 (1689); Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of
Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1746 (1996) [hereinafter
Schwartz, Employer Vicarious Liability]. As late as the 1680s, English courts ruled
that an employer was liable only if he had “commanded” the specific negligent act
of his employee, rejecting employer vicarious liability. Gary T. Schwartz, The
Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 641, 695 (1989) [hereinafter
Schwartz, Early American Tort Law].
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Exchequer in 1721, but was accepted in a 1738 decision and
81
restated by Blackstone in his 1765 Commentaries.
American courts accepted employer vicarious liability in the
82
early 1800s. At first, the application of the doctrine was imperfect
83
and uncertain. Today, however, vicarious liability is consistently
applied to hold an employer liable for its employee’s negligent act
toward a third party, as a result of a special relationship between
84
the employer and employee.
Vicarious liability must be justified differently than negligence
liability because it imposes liability on a party not at fault, typically
85
an employer. There are at least three identified policy goals of
the vicarious liability doctrine: (1) enterprise liability/allocation of
resources;
(2)
risk/loss
spreading;
and
(3)
86
prevention/deterrence.
79. Naish v. E. India Co., 92 Eng. Rep. 1160, 1163 (1721) (“[n]othing is . . .
more certain” than that a master is not per se liable for his servant’s in-service
wrongs).
80. Jarvis v. Hayes, 93 Eng. Rep. 1047 (1738).
81. Schwartz, Early American Tort Law, supra note 78, at 695. See also 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 430–31 (1765).
82. Schwartz, Employer Vicarious Liability, supra note 78, at 1746.
83. For example, since Justice Holt and Blackstone each characterized the
rule as a resolution of the equities between the employer and a “stranger,”
American courts gave the vicarious liability doctrine a narrow interpretation with
respect to the issue of an employer’s liability to an injured employee. Schwartz, Early
American Tort Law, supra note 78, at 696–97; Schwartz, Employer Vicarious Liability,
supra note 78, at 1747–48.
84. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS 660
(11th ed. 2005).
85. Koevary, supra note 76, at 663.
86. ARTHUR BEST & DAVID W. BARNES, BASIC TORT LAW 390 (2003); Steven N.
Bulloch, Fraud Liability Under Agency Principles: A New Approach, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 301, 303 (1986). Thomas Baty analyzed nine different justifications that had
historically been put forth for vicarious liability: (1) Control—Based on the
premise that to an extent, a master controls the actions of his servant; (2) Master’s
Benefit from Servant’s Work—The master should bear the burdens caused by
servants because the master obtains the benefit of the servant’s work; (3)
Revenge—Put forward by Holmes because he thought vicarious liability for
servants originated with liability for actions of slaves; (4) Care and choice—If the
master chooses his servants poorly, he ought to suffer, rather than the innocent
victim; (5) Identification—Qui facit per alium facit per se, the servant’s act is the
master’s act; (6) Evidence—It is often difficult to identify the individual
responsible for a tortious act; where all possible responsible parties are servants of
the same master, vicarious liability ensures the plaintiff will succeed; (7)
Indulgence—Bacon originally put forth this idea that people are allowed to
employ others only by an indulgence of the law, and part of the price they must
pay is liability for their servant’s acts; (8) Danger—Pollock believed that a person
who employed a servant was setting a dangerous operation into motion, which is
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Enterprise Liability/Allocation of Resources

Enterprise liability theory focuses on allocation of resources. It
is “the means by which society seeks to ensure that the employer
87
In Judge Friendly’s view,
bears the costs of its operation.”
vicarious liability finds its basis “in a deeply rooted sentiment that a
business enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for
accidents which may fairly be said to be characteristic of its
88
activities.” Under this theory, an employer is liable for torts of its
employee because the employee is acting for the employer’s
benefit, and the enterprise is liable for the costs associated with
89
doing business. The price of a good or activity should reflect any
accident costs it might cause, and if an enterprise is held liable for
90
harms it causes, the “internalization of costs” is facilitated. An
underlying aspect of this theory is also the principle that no party
91
should be left without recourse to compensation for its injuries.
The enterprise liability theory is based on the allocation of
92
resources justification. A fundamental assumption is that on the
93
whole, people know what is best for them. It is important for
people to know the costs of producing goods in order to determine

analogous to keeping a water reservoir or wild animals on one’s land; (9)
Satisfaction—An employer is usually wealthier than a servant and is capable of
paying damages while a servant usually is not. PATRICK S. ATIYAH, VICARIOUS
LIABILITY IN THE LAW OF TORTS 15–22 (1967).
87. JEFFREY M. KAPLAN ET AL., COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AND THE CORPORATE
SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 24:2 (2006). See Bulloch, supra note 86, at 316 (stating
that the “price of the employer’s product should reflect the cost of compensating
the [potential tort] victim”); Koevary, supra note 76, at 663 (stating that enterprise
liability, the “predominant theory” justifying vicarious liability, “holds that an
enterprise should be liable for the costs associated with its business”).
88. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d. Cir.
1968).
89. Koevary, supra note 76, at 663–64.
90. DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 625 (5th ed.
2005).
91. Koevary, supra note 76, at 664–65. Under enterprise liability, the chances
a plaintiff can recover are increased because he can sue more or wealthier
defendants, and victims of insolvent employees are left with a remedy. Id. As a
result, the enterprise is allowed to “impose large costs on society through actions
of their employees.” Id. at 665. According to the enterprise liability theory, the
Urbans should not have to face the risk that Post 184 is insolvent, and American
Legion Department of Minnesota and the American Legion National should be
responsible for the cost of doing business.
92. Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499, 501–02 (1961).
93. Id. at 502.
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94

what they really want.
Prices should reflect actual costs of
competing goods, which enables buyers to make informed
95
decisions in purchases. Under a strict resource allocation theory,
it is important for the prices of goods to accurately reflect their full
96
cost to society. Hence, the theory requires that the cost of injuries
be borne by the activities that caused them, regardless of whether
97
fault is involved. The theory also requires that “among the several
parties engaged in an enterprise the loss should be placed on the
party which is most likely to cause the burden to be reflected in the
98
price of whatever the enterprise sells.”
2.

Risk/Loss Spreading

The second theory of justification for vicarious liability
99
attempts to shift risk to those better positioned to spread losses.
Proponents of the loss-spreading theory suggest that enterprises are
100
more capable of spreading losses. One reason for their theory is

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 505.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. KAPLAN, supra note 87; Bulloch, supra note 86, at 316. In 1923, Young B.
Smith introduced the loss-spreading theory in an article for the Columbia Law
Review entitled Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444 (1923) (noting that the
master should be held responsible for his servant’s actions because “it is socially
more expedient to spread or distribute among a large group of the community the
losses which experience has taught are inevitable in the carrying on of industry,
than to cast the loss upon a few”). The principle of loss distribution first came to
be recognized in the field of industrial accidents. ATIYAH, supra note 86, at 23.
The cost of industrial accidents was originally not placed on the employer, but
instead a great part of the cost was imposed on the victim. Id. In 1881, Sir Edwin
Chadwick opposed views that industrial accidents should not be paid for by
employers, based on the reasoning that they were not the employer’s fault, and
that they were inevitable risks of employment. Id. at 23–24. Instead, Chadwick
said, “[T]he costs of the accidents, and of the resultant widowhood and orphanage
are a necessary consequence of your business and should be borne by the trade,
and ultimately by the consumer, and not by the parish rates on which they are so
heavy a burden.” Id. at 24. Eventually, this view was used as a justification for the
Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1897. Id. It was soon discovered that the same
principles were present in cases of vicarious liability. Id.
100. Bulloch, supra note 86, at 306. Underlying this theory is the assumption
that the injured party would have to bear the entire loss if the enterprise is not
made to absorb it. Id. In Urban, the Department and National are presumably in a
better position to absorb the costs of the injuries because insurance is arguably
more easily obtainable by them. See generally Urban v. Am. Legion Dep’t of Minn.,
723 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2006).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss4/7

12

Mann: Torts: Respondeat Superior and the CDA: Letting the Superior Off
9. MANN - ADC

2008]

6/11/2008 6:03:34 PM

URBAN V. AMERICAN LEGION

1501
101

that most employers are not individuals, but corporations.
The
cost of liabilities can be spread by an enterprise over a period of
time, and “distributed [across] a larger section of the
102
community.” Enterprises can use “the mechanisms of insurance,
profit reduction, wage reduction, and price increases” to distribute
103
costs.
In this way, losses can be efficiently spread among
104
employees, customers, producers of similar products, and others.
For example, an enterprise generally insures itself against legal
105
liabilities.
Insurance costs can be covered by goods and services
sold, which in turn will be passed on to the consumer in the form
106
of higher prices.
Even if an enterprise does not have insurance, or if it is
uneconomical to pass extra costs on through higher prices,
107
Increased costs
enterprises are still capable of spreading losses.
may be distributed among the shareholders, staff, and employees of
108
the enterprise.
This is accomplished through smaller dividend
payments to shareholders and smaller wage increases for
109
employees.
To allocate part of the cost to one class rather than
110
Typically, both
the other would be practically impossible.
methods of distribution will occur, and it will be impossible to
isolate the cost incurred from insurance against tort liabilities
because so many factors are present in management decisions
111
regarding dividends, prices, and wages.
3.

Deterrence/Prevention

Finally, deterrence/prevention is a theory often used to justify
112
vicarious liability.
This theory operates under the assumption
that masters have the ability to control servants and are in the best
101. ATIYAH, supra note 86, at 23.
102. Id.
103. Bulloch, supra note 86, at 306.
104. Id.
105. See ATIYAH, supra note 86, at 23.
106. Id. Furthermore, the consumer may also be able to spread the cost if the
consumer is a business entity, rather than an individual. Id.
107. Id. Some larger enterprises will find it more appropriate to self-insure.
Id. It may not be possible for an enterprise to pass on costs through higher prices
because of fierce competition in the industry. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. KAPLAN, supra note 87.
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113

position to prevent torts. In theory, “if the tortfeasor is a servant
and the tort is committed within the scope of [his] employment, no
one, other than the tortfeasor himself, is in a better position than
114
the master to prevent the [tortious action].”
Furthermore,
imposing liability “creates a strong incentive for vigilance by those
in a position ‘to guard substantially against the evil to be
115
prevented.’”
Strict liability for an employee’s tort will
theoretically encourage employers to take necessary precautions to
116
prevent torts from occurring. For example, an employee making
a delivery using his employer’s vehicle runs a red light and injures a
117
pedestrian. Both the employee and the employer will be liable to
118
the pedestrian for the pedestrian’s injuries.
Under the
prevention theory, the employer could, and presumably should,
have taken precautions to prevent the accident, such as requiring
119
traffic safety training for its drivers.
113. Bulloch, supra note 86, at 315. Some might argue that, for this control
reason, the Department and National should not be vicariously liable. See Urban v.
Am. Legion Dep’t of Minn., 723 N.W.2d 1, 5–6 (Minn. 2006) (concluding that
because the legislature has chosen not to include an element of vicarious liability
in the CDA since its enactment, the exclusion is significant). In
the
dissent,
however, Justice Hanson makes a valid point that while the quantity of control by
the Department and National is not likely sufficient to create a principal-agent
relationship, the two do have the right to control the “specific aspect of [Post
184’s] business that is alleged to have caused the [plaintiffs’] harm.” Id. at 13
(Hanson, J., dissenting) (quoting Kerl v. Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 682 N.W.2d 328,
341 (2004)). Justice Hanson went on to explain that the aspect of Post 184’s
business that caused the harm is the illegal sale of alcohol to a non-Legion
member, which is specifically prohibited by the Department and National. Id.
The enforcement of the rule is essential to the Department and National because
if it is not enforced they might lose a group tax exemption granted by the Internal
Revenue Service. Id. Under the rules of the exemption, only members of
National may be served in bars of the local posts. Id. Under this reasoning,
vicarious liability is applicable. Id.
114. Bulloch, supra note 86, at 303–04.
115. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 14 (1991) (quoting Louis
Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 116 (1927)).
116. Bulloch, supra note 86, at 304. The rule may seem overbroad when
viewed this way. DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND LLCS § 3.2.3
(Aspen 3d ed. forthcoming 2008). If the goal is to encourage employers to engage
in conduct that enables employees to act safely, why impose liability when the
employer has used reasonable care to select, train, and supervise its employees
properly? Id. There are two possible answers to this question. Id. First, both
enterprise liability and risk spreading take a broad approach to imposing liability.
Id. Second, a narrow rule would lead to problems proving negligence on the part
of the employer, making the rule ineffective. Id.
117. Bulloch, supra note 86, at 304.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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D. Respondeat Superior
The primary application of vicarious liability is “an employer’s
obligation to pay for an employee’s tortious conduct,” known as
120
respondeat superior.
In 1894, Professor John Wigmore
determined that the evolution of respondeat superior occurred in
121
three phases from the 1500s to the 1800s. Originally, respondeat
superior was based on a theory in which the master himself
breached his duty to the plaintiff by ordering his servant to commit
122
a tort. After Lord Holt was appointed Chief Justice of the King’s
123
Bench in 1689, the Implied Command theory developed.
The
Implied Command theory imposed liability on an innocent master
because “seeing somebody must be a loser . . . it is more reason that
he that employs and puts a trust and confidence in the wrongdoer
124
should be a loser, than a stranger.”
Under the modern common-law doctrine of respondeat
125
superior, an employer may be held vicariously liable for a tort

120. BEST & BARNES, supra note 86, at 387.
121. Rhett B. Franklin, Pouring New Wine Into an Old Bottle: A Recommendation
For Determining Liability of an Employer Under Respondeat Superior, 39 S.D. L. REV. 570,
573–74 (1994).
122. Id. at 574.
123. Id.
124. Id. at n.32 (quoting S.C. Ins. Co. v. James C. Greene & Co., 348 S.E.2d
617, 622 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986)).
125. The terminology relating to respondeat superior is in transition.
KLEINBERGER, supra note 116, § 3.2.2. Under the Restatement (Second) of Agency,
“[a] servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and
who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is
subject to the other's control or right to control.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 220 (1958). Under the Restatement (Third) of Agency, “an employee is
an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner and
means of the agent's performance of work . . . .” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§ 7.07(3)(a) (2006).
The Restatement (Third) of Agency modified the
terminology because “the connotation that household service is the prototype for
employment is dated, as is its suggestion that an employer has an all-pervasive
right of control over most dimensions of the employee's life.” Id. at intro. cmt. B.
“The difference is a matter of semantics, not substance.” KLEINBERGER, supra note
116, § 3.2.2.
Unfortunately, the current Restatement terminology is not a perfect
solution because “employer” and “employee” have well-established everyday
meanings. Id. “The resulting connotation is that the agency law meaning
corresponds to the ordinary meaning, and that connotation is inaccurate. While
all employees in the lay sense may well be employees in the [Restatement (Third)]
sense, not all [Restatement (Third)] employees are necessarily employees in the
lay sense.” Id.
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126

committed by his employee if the tort was committed within the
127
If applicable, respondeat superior
scope of employment.
automatically holds the employer liable for the employee’s tortious
actions, regardless of whether the employer authorized, forbade, or
128
used all reasonable means to prevent the misconduct.
III. THE URBAN DECISION
In Urban, Todd Urban and his family were involved in a
collision with a drunk driver. The collision resulted in injuries to
himself and his children, as well as the loss of his wife. Urban, on
behalf of himself and his minor children, brought an action against
American Legion Post 184 (the place where Rolland, the drunk
129
The Urbans also
driver, became intoxicated) under the CDA.
sued the American Legion Department of Minnesota
(Department) and the American Legion National (National)
130
The
under alternative theories including respondeat superior.
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the

126. The Restatement (Third) of Agency outlines factors relevant in
determining whether an agent is an employee:
[T]he extent of control that the agent and the principal have agreed the
principal may exercise over details of the work; whether the agent is
engaged in a distinct occupation or business; whether the type of work
done by the agent is customarily done under a principal's direction or
without supervision; the skill required in the agent's occupation; whether
the agent or the principal supplies the tools and other instrumentalities
required for the work and the place in which to perform it; the length of
time during which the agent is engaged by a principal; whether the agent
is paid by the job or by the time worked; whether the agent's work is part
of the principal's regular business; whether the principal and the agent
believe that they are creating an employment relationship; and whether
the principal is or is not in business. Also relevant is the extent of control
that the principal has exercised in practice over the details of the agent's
work.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f (2006).
127. Franklin, supra note 121, at 572. In order for the doctrine to apply, there
must be a master-servant relationship between the employer and the employee
who commits the tort and the tort must be committed within the employee’s
“scope of employment.” Id. at 572–73. “Scope of employment” is defined as
“[t]he range of reasonable and foreseeable activities that an employee engages in
while carrying out the employer’s business.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1374 (8th
ed. 2004).
128. KLEINBERGER, supra note 116, §3.2.1.
129. Urban v. Am. Legion Post 184, 695 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Minn. Ct. App.
2005).
130. Urban v. Am. Legion Dep’t of Minn., 723 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Minn. 2006).
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131

Department and National on all theories.
The court of appeals
132
Urban appealed to the
affirmed the summary judgment rulings.
133
Minnesota Supreme Court.
A. Majority Opinion
The Minnesota Supreme Court addressed whether the
Department and National could be held vicariously liable on the
theory of respondeat superior for Post 184’s liquor sale to
134
Rolland. The court first looked to the language of the CDA and
agreed with the Department and National that, because the
language of the statute narrows the previous scope of the law from
“employers” to “licensees,” the legislature specifically limited
135
vicarious liability under the CDA.
The CDA created a cause of action that did not exist at
136
The court relied on the presumption that statutes
common law.
creating new causes of action do not abolish the common law
137
unless they do so “by express wording or necessary implication.”
The court also presumed that every statute has a purpose, so no
statutory language should be deemed unnecessary or
138
Furthermore, the court stated that Minnesota
insignificant.
Statutes section 340A.501, which makes licensees responsible for
the sale of alcohol by their employees, implies that the legislature
139
did not expect respondeat superior to apply to CDA liability. The
court opined that if respondeat superior applied to actions under
140
the CDA, section 340A.501 would have no purpose.
The court further argued that the doctrine of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius—the expression of one thing indicates the exclusion
141
of another —suggests that the legislature meant that only licensees
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 3.
135. Id. at 5 (comparing MINN. STAT. § 340.941 (1984) with MINN. STAT. §
340A.501 (2004)).
136. Id. (citing Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 34, 70 N.W.2d 886, 891 (1955)).
137. Id. (citing Shaw Acquisition Co. v. Bank of Elk River, 639 N.W.2d 837, 877
(Minn. 2002)).
138. Id. (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs., Inc. v. Comm’r, 698 N.W.2d 408,
423 (Minn. 2004); Vlahos v. R & I Constr. of Bloomington, Inc., 676 N.W.2d 672,
679 (Minn. 2004)).
139. Id. at 5.
140. Id.
141. Id. See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004). For example, the
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are vicariously liable for the alcohol distribution.
The court
noted that the legislature had ample opportunity to recognize
vicarious liability as it has in other statutes, since the CDA was
143
enacted nearly 100 years ago.
The court therefore “declines to
144
act where the legislature has chosen not to.”
Finally, the court stated that the legislature’s elimination of
social-host liability leads it to conclude that the policy underlying
the CDA is to “apply liability for alcohol-related harms to commercial
145
Even if the CDA
vendors who profit from the sale of alcohol.”
applied to owners of licensees where owners receive profits from
alcohol sales, the court argued that the Department and National
would not be liable because neither receives revenue or profits
146
from alcohol sales.
B. Dissent
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Hanson concluded that the
CDA does not abrogate, but instead incorporates, common-law
147
principles of vicarious liability.
He reasoned that the underlying
cause of action alleged against Post 184 was for direct liability
rule that “each citizen is entitled to vote” implies that noncitizens are not entitled
to vote. Id.
142. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 5.
143. Id. at 5–6. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 169.09, subdiv. 5(a) (Supp. 2005). In
1972, the court concluded that the CDA permitted social-host liability because
liability could be incurred by “giving” alcohol to tortfeasors. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at
6 (citing Koehnen v. Dufour, 590 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Minn. 1999)). Shortly
thereafter, the legislature amended the CDA to remove “giving” and the court
held that the amendment makes clear that the legislature was specifically denying
social host liability. Id. (citing Cole v. City of Spring Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836,
840 (Minn. 1982)).
144. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 6. The court went on to say that the CDA may be
“liberally construed” where its “provisions are clear as to intent and purpose,” but
must be “strictly construed in the sense that it cannot be enlarged beyond its
definite scope.” Id. (quoting Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 34, 70 N.W.2d 886, 891
(1955)). See generally 45 AM. JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors § 460 (2007) (discussing
interpretation of dram shop statutes).
145. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 6 (citing Cady v. Coleman, 315 N.W.2d 593, 595–96
(Minn. 1982)).
146. Id. The Urbans argued that the court should extend respondeat superior
because the decision in Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 438, 57 N.W.2d
254, 262 (1943) states that masters may be held liable for the actions of their
servants under the CDA. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 6–7. The court dispelled this
argument by stating that while Hahn used a master-servant argument, it was
decided before the legislature adopted section 340A.501, which amended the
CDA. Id. at 7.
147. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 7 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
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under the CDA, but the claim against the Department and National
was for vicarious liability under common-law principles of
148
respondeat superior.
In support of this conclusion, Justice
Hanson indicated that Hahn pointed out that common-law
vicarious liability applies to the CDA, and a principal may be held
liable under common-law respondeat superior where its agent is
149
The true legal issue,
directly liable under the CDA statute.
according to the dissent, is whether, under Hahn, the Department
and National were vicariously liable under common law as
150
principals of Post 184 for the direct statutory liability of Post 184.
The dissent also argued that the CDA has been construed
liberally in determining proper plaintiffs to bring CDA claims, and
the same liberal rule of construction should be used in deciding
151
Justice Hanson argued that
proper defendants to a CDA claim.
the maxim “the expression of one thing indicates the exclusion of
152
another” is not applicable where the two things are consistent.
He also agreed with Professor Dickerson’s opinion that expressio
unius est exclusio alterius is one of a few Latin maxims that
“masquerade as rules of interpretation while doing nothing more
153
than describing results reached by other means.” Justice Hanson
dismissed the majority’s arguments relating to profits from alcohol
sales and the analogy to social hosts by stating that these facts are
only relevant to direct liability under the CDA, not vicarious
154
liability.
Finally, the dissent suggested that the failure of the
legislature to address vicarious liability in the CDA statute does not
155
indicate intent to eliminate it.
148. Id. at 8. Justice Hanson opined that the majority commingled the
separate theories of liability (direct liability under CDA and vicarious liability
under respondeat superior) and applied the elements of one to the analysis of the
other. Id.
149. Id. Hanson read the language of section 340A.501 as adding to a
licensee’s common law vicarious liability as an employer by creating a direct
statutory liability, rather than limiting vicarious liability only to licensees. Id.
150. Id. The court’s case law on the rule of statutory construction for newly
created causes of action creates a presumption that statutes are consistent with the
common law and should be construed strictly against the notion that they
abrogate the common law. Id. (citing Shaw Acquisition Co. v. Bank of Elk River,
639 N.W.2d 837, 877 (Minn. 2002)).
151. Id. at 9–10.
152. Id. at 10.
153. Id. See also DICKERSON, supra note 27, at 234–35.
154. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 11 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
155. Id. Justice Hanson gave two reasons to support his conclusion. First, in
over forty years since Hahn, the legislature took no action to eliminate common
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE URBAN DECISION
The Minnesota Supreme Court is forced to deal with
competing interests in its examination of Urban. On one hand, the
CDA must be “strictly construed in the sense that it cannot be
156
enlarged beyond its definite scope.” On the other hand, a statute
creating a new cause of action, such as the CDA, must not abrogate
common law unless it does so “by express wording or necessary
157
implication.”
The majority’s approach to resolving the competing interests is
unsound for a number of reasons. First, the court mistakenly
commingled direct statutory liability under the CDA with vicarious
158
Next, the
liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
159
court employed a flawed theory of statutory construction. Finally,
the court erroneously concluded that legislative inaction affirms
160
judicial correctness.
A. CDA/Vicarious Liability Split
In Hahn, the Minnesota Supreme Court holds that commonlaw vicarious liability is applicable under the CDA to make a master
liable for the torts of its servants acting within the scope of
161
Through section 340A.501 of Minnesota Statutes,
employment.
the legislature specifically extended liability to licensees for sales of
162
alcohol made by their employees. In the view of Justice Hanson,
section 340A.501 supplements the common-law vicarious liability of
a licensee by creating direct statutory liability for licensees, who
may or may not already be liable as employers under the common
163
law.
The majority focused its analysis on whether the

law vicarious liability under the CDA. Id. Second, until the court of appeals’
decision in this case, the legislature did not have a reason to consider that a court
might interpret section 340A.501 as abrogating vicarious liability. Id.
156. Id. at 6 (majority opinion) (quoting Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 34, 70
N.W.2d 886, 891 (1955)).
157. Id. at 5 (quoting Shaw Acquisition Co. v. Bank of Elk River, 639 N.W.2d
837, 877 (Minn. 2002)).
158. See infra Part IV.A.
159. See infra Part IV.B.
160. See infra Part IV.C.
161. Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 438, 57 N.W.2d 254, 262
(1953).
162. MINN. STAT. § 340A.501 (2004).
163. Urban v. Am. Legion Dep’t of Minn., 723 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 2006)
(Hanson, J., dissenting).
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Department and National had direct statutory liability under
164
Instead, the majority should have focused on
section 340A.501.
whether the Department and National had common-law vicarious
liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior, as principals for
Post 184, which was directly liable under the CDA. This mistake
renders the majority’s reasoning flawed from the start.
B. Statutory Construction
The court relied on the principle expressio unius est exlusio
alterius in reaching its decision that only licensees are liable under
165
the CDA.
Latin canons of statutory construction, particularly
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, have been highly criticized for
166
In particular, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
many years.
reliance on expressio unius in the Urban case is unsatisfactory
because, in the words of Professor Dickerson, it is used to
167
“describ[e] results reached by other means.”
The majority argued that section 340A.501 limits liability
168
under the CDA to licensees, thereby abrogating the common law.
In his dissent, however, Justice Hanson correctly argued that
section 340A.501 enlarges common-law respondeat superior liability
of a licensee by eliminating two possible defenses available under
the common law: (1) the licensee is not the employer of the person
making the illegal sale; and (2) the person making the illegal sale is
169
not acting within the scope of his or her employment.
The court’s “well-settled case law” on statutory construction for
statutes that create new causes of action presumes that statutes do
not abrogate the common law unless they do so by “express
170
Justice Hanson further
wording or necessary implication.”
clarified that although the court has said it construes such statutes
“strictly,” it has meant that it construes them “strictly against the
171
Justice Hanson
notion that they abrogate the common law.”
continued, “we construe such statutes liberally in favor of the
172
continued existence of the common law.” But, the majority turns
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See id. at 4–5 (majority opinion).
Id. at 5.
See, e.g., DICKERSON, supra note 27, at 234.
Id.
Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 6.
Id. at 11 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
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that rule on its head by presuming that the failure to mention
common-law vicarious liability principles means the legislature
intended to abrogate them.
There are a number of reasons why expressio unius “is not
173
First, the
useful as a standard of construction” in this case.
174
maxim is not meant to be used and applied universally. It is not a
175
rule of law, but merely an aid to construction. More specifically,
the rule is applicable only in the interpretation of statutes in which
176
the intention of the lawmakers is not otherwise clear.
It should
177
never be used to override the clear purpose of the legislature.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held in Hollerich v. City of Good
Thunder that it is appropriate to consider the purpose of the Dram
Shop Act as an aid to interpreting statutory language and
178
According to the prevailing view,
determining legislative intent.
“civil damage acts . . . are to be liberally construed so as to suppress
179
the mischief and advance the remedy.”
The CDA “provides an
extremely effective incentive for liquor vendors to do everything in
their power to avoid making illegal sales,” by imposing the sanction
180
of strict liability.
Simultaneously, the CDA “compensate[s]
members of the public who are injured as a result of illegal liquor
181
sales . . . .”
If the CDA’s purpose is to be a means to interpret the intent of
the legislature, then restricting liability to only Post 184 is not in
accordance with that intent. Legislative intent as to the application
of the CDA is not ambiguous, and therefore, the use of expressio
182
unius est exclusio alterius is not appropriate.
Another reason expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not a fitting
maxim of statutory construction is that it assumes legislative
183
omniscience. According to critics, the maxim “would make sense
173. Id. at 10.
174. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 130 (2007).
175. Id.
176. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 130 (2007); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 323 (2007).
177. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 130 (2007); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 323 (2007).
178. Hollerich v. City of Good Thunder, 340 N.W.2d 665, 667 (Minn. 1983).
179. Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 436, 57 N.W.2d 254, 261
(1953).
180. Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co., 281 Minn. 417, 423, 161 N.W.2d 657, 661
(1968).
181. Id. at 422, 161 N.W.2d at 661.
182. See Skaja, 281 Minn. at 422, 161 N.W.2d at 661; Hahn, 238 Minn. at 436, 57
N.W.2d at 261.
183. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the
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only if all omissions in legislative drafting were deliberate.”
Expressio unius “assumes that the legislature thinks through
185
statutory language carefully, considering every possible variation.”
Unfortunately, this is often untrue because the legislature does not
think about certain possibilities or it assumes courts will fill in any
186
In 1973, Judge Skelly Wright deemed the maxim
gaps.
increasingly unreliable because “it stands on the faulty premise that
all possible alternative or supplemental provisions were necessarily
187
considered and rejected by the legislative draftsmen.”
When the legislature added section 340A.501 to the CDA, it is
extremely likely that it did not think about the possibility that the
court would interpret its express mention of licensees as an
exclusion of other classes of principals liable under the common
law. It is irrational to assume that the failure of the legislature to
mention common-law principles of vicarious liability indicates that
the principles were “considered and rejected by the legislative
188
draftsmen.”
Legislative omniscience is not a valid assumption,
which adds further force to the argument that expressio unius is
highly unreliable in statutory construction.
A third limitation of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius is that context must determine its applicability. Professor
Reed Dickerson argues that it is one of several Latin maxims that
“masquerade as rules of interpretation while doing nothing more
189
than describing results reached by other means.” He adds:
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 813 (1983).
184. Id.
185. ESKRIDGE, supra note 25, at 824.
186. See id.
187. Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 482 F.2d 672, 676
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
188. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 25, at 824. This is true especially in light of the
long-standing presumption that statutes creating new causes of action do not
abrogate the common law. Since the legislature knew that an employer was
already held responsible for the torts of its employee, the express mention of
common-law vicarious liability was probably deemed unnecessary.
189. DICKERSON, supra note 27, at 234. Perhaps, then, the majority had
alternative grounds upon which it based its decision not to allow the vicariousliability claims against the Department and National. Vicarious liability is one of
the most firmly established common-law principles, but many lawyers have felt that
there is something so exceptional about vicarious liability that it needs
justification. ATIYAH, supra note 86, at 12. One author opined, “[t]hat there could
hardly be greater injustice than to take away A’s property and give it to B because
C has injured B seems clear, yet that is the result of the maxim respondeat superior.”
Id. (quoting Frederic Cunningham, Respondeat Superior in Admiralty, 19 HARV. L.
REV. 445, 445 (1906)). At first glance, vicarious liability appears to contradict two
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Far from being a rule, it is not even lexicographically
accurate, because it is simply not true, generally, that the
mere express conferral of a right or privilege in one kind
of situation implies the denial of the equivalent right or
privilege in other kinds.
Sometimes it does and
sometimes it does not, and whether it does or does not
depends on the particular circumstances of context.
Without contextual support, therefore, there is not even a
mild presumption here. Accordingly, this maxim is at best
a description, after the fact, of what the court has
190
discovered from context.
In determining whether context allows application of the
maxim, one must determine whether the “contrast between a
specific subject matter which is expressed and one not mentioned
leads to an inference that the latter was not intended to be
191
If there is a special reason for mentioning one
included . . . .”
thing and not the other, which is otherwise within the statute, the
192
absence of mention of the other thing will not exclude it.
The
maxim also does not apply to a statute in which some things are
193
mentioned only by way of example.
The contextual argument against the application of expressio
194
He
unius is present in Justice Hanson’s dissenting opinion.
correctly argued that the maxim may describe a logical conclusion
where the included item is inconsistent with the excluded item, but
195
that where the two items are consistent, it makes no logical sense.
In Urban, the two things are direct statutory liability of a licensee
under the CDA and vicarious liability of the licensee’s principal
196
under respondeat superior. The two are complementary because, in
principles of torts. Id. First, it seems a person should only be liable for damages
caused by his acts or omissions. Id. Second, a person should only be liable when
he is at fault. Id. Nonetheless, the policy reasons underlying the doctrine of
vicarious liability provide a stronger argument for allowing the suits to be brought.
190. DICKERSON, supra note 27, at 234–35 (footnotes omitted). For example,
Mother tells Sally, “Don’t hit, kick, or bite your sister Anne.” ESKRIDGE, supra note
25, at 824–25. Sally is not authorized by expressio unius to “pinch” her little sister,
because the baseline “no harming sister” should not be narrowly limited. Id. On
the other hand, if Mother tells Sally, “You may have a cookie and a scoop of ice
cream,” Sally may not have the candy bar sitting on the table. Id.
191. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 323 (1999).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Urban v. Am. Legion Dep’t of Minn., 723 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2006)
(Hanson, J., dissenting).
195. Id.
196. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss4/7

24

Mann: Torts: Respondeat Superior and the CDA: Letting the Superior Off
9. MANN - ADC

2008]

6/11/2008 6:03:34 PM

URBAN V. AMERICAN LEGION

1513

its own way, each serves the purpose of strengthening the
regulation of the sale of alcohol and furthers the purpose of the
197
CDA.
There is no contextual support for the application of
expressio unius here, and therefore, it should not be applied.
A final flaw in the application of expressio unius, and of maxims
of statutory construction in general, is that every canon has an
equal and opposite counter canon. Nearly sixty years ago, Karl
Llewellyn offered the theory that, “[a]s in argument over points of
case-law, the accepted convention still, unhappily requires
discussion as if only one single correct meaning could exist. Hence
198
In
there are two opposing canons on almost every point.”
opposition to “[e]xpression of one thing excludes another,”
Llewellyn countered: “[t]he language may fairly comprehend many
different cases where some only are expressly mentioned by way of
199
example.”
In the Urban case, one might argue that principals should be
included because the CDA could comprehend cases beyond those
specifically mentioned in the statute’s language, particularly if it is
evident that the statute has a purpose that would be advanced by
200
As evidenced in Hollerich, the CDA’s
including principals.
purpose would be advanced by construing the statute to include
201
liability by principals.
One might also argue in opposition to expressio unius, as Justice
Hanson did in his dissenting opinion, that statutes creating new
causes of action should be strictly construed against the notion that
202
they abrogate the common law. Another possible counter to the
expressio unius canon is that remedial statutes should be construed
203
liberally to “suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.” The
CDA has a remedial objective and therefore should be construed
liberally to compensate members of the public who are injured by

197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 405.
200. See W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. REV.
1167, 1185–88 (2005) (discussing Llewellyn’s theories by using an example of a
railroad company governed by a federal statute).
201. See Hollerich v. City of Good Thunder, 340 N.W.2d 665, 667–68 (Minn.
1983).
202. Urban v. Am. Legion Dep’t of Minn., 723 N.W.2d 9, 10 (Minn. 2006)
(Hanson, J., dissenting).
203. Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 436, 57 N.W.2d 254, 261
(1953).
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204

illegal liquor sales.
In light of the counter canons that can be
offered in opposition to expressio unius, it is clearly not sufficient to
explain the reasoning of the court.
C.

Legislative Inaction

In Urban, the majority argued that if the legislature had
intended for vicarious liability to apply under the CDA it would
have amended the CDA to include this liability, and the majority
205
Not
“declines to act where the legislature has chosen not to.”
only is the majority’s logic faulty, but the practice of inferring
legislative intent through legislative inaction is ill-advised.
The majority claimed that in the “nearly 100 years since
enacting the CDA,” the legislature has had “ample opportunity . . .
206
to recognize vicarious liability.”
In contrast, the Hahn court, in
1953, found that vicarious liability applied under the CDA to hold
207
As
the employer of the person making the illegal sale liable.
Justice Hanson pointed out in his dissenting opinion, the
legislature has taken no action in over forty years since Hahn to
eliminate the common-law claim of vicarious liability under the
208
CDA.
Instead, in 1985, the legislation extended direct statutory
liability to licensees who otherwise would have had to satisfy the
209
elements of common-law vicarious liability.
The portion of the CDA that the majority claims abrogates
common-law vicarious liability was not enacted until 1985.
Therefore, the majority is incorrect in stating that the legislature
has had “ample opportunity in the nearly 100 years since enacting
210
Furthermore, until the
the CDA to recognize vicarious liability.”
Minnesota Court of Appeals decided Urban in 2005, the legislature
had no reason to think that Minnesota courts might interpret
211
section 340A.501 as limiting the CDA to licensees.
Therefore, it
is incorrect for the majority to assume that the legislature’s failure
to act affirms the court’s interpretation of the statute.

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

See Hollerich, 340 N.W.2d at 668.
Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 5–6.
Id. at 5.
Hahn, 238 Minn. at 438, 57 N.W.2d at 262.
Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 11 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
MINN. STAT. § 340A.501 (2004).
Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 5 (majority opinion).
See id. at 11 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
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Regardless of whether the legislature had time to amend the
CDA, the majority’s suggestion that legislative inaction equates to
judicial accuracy is misguided. “In the realities of the legislative
process, almost no reliable inference of current intent could be
212
The legislature may be unaware
drawn” from legislative silence.
213
of relevant court decisions applying the particular statute.
The
legislature may also be too busy with other public matters to take
214
Alternatively, the
action in response to a court’s decision.
legislature may not “consider the matter important enough to
215
engage the attention of the whole legislative process.”
Justice Scalia has adamantly disagreed with the view that
legislative inaction can effectively be interpreted in any consistent
way:
The “complicated check on legislation,” The Federalist
216
No. 62, p. 378 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961), erected by our
Constitution creates an inertia that makes it impossible to
assert with any degree of assurance that congressional
failure to act represents (1) approval of the status quo, as
opposed to (2) inability to agree upon how to alter the
status quo, (3) unawareness of the status quo, (4)
indifference to the status quo, or even (5) political
cowardice . . . . I think we should admit that vindication
217
by congressional inaction is a canard.

212. DICKERSON, supra note 27, at 181.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. Professor Dickerson gave an example of the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Mann Act in Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1916).
“Certainly the . . . interpretation . . . was considered a perversion of congressional
intent, and yet political considerations intervened to head off corrective
legislation.” Id.
216. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 378 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
217. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia opined that if “congressional inaction proves judicial
correctness,” it is difficult to explain the results of the application of the liability of
municipal corporations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. Scalia goes on to mention
that in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), the Court held that section 1983
did not reach municipalities. Id. After Congress did not overturn the decision,
the Court was once again faced with the question in Monell v. New York City
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978), and it overturned the Monroe
decision. Id. The Johnson majority believed that the Monell decision was wrongly
based on Congress’ seventeen years of silence, which the Johnson Court felt
established that Monroe’s interpretation was correct. Id. At the time of the Johnson
opinion, nine years had passed since the Monell opinion, and Congress still had
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The premise that if the legislature had intended for vicarious
liability to apply to the CDA it would have amended the statute to
218
expressly include it is unfounded.
V. CONCLUSION
In Urban, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that the
doctrine of respondeat superior is based not on the fault of the
employer, but on the policy determination that liability should be
219
allocated to the employer as a cost of engaging in business. The
220
doctrine’s objective of “let[ting] the superior make answer”
complies with the remedial purpose of the CDA. The two theories
of liability serve the same purpose of strengthening the regulation
of alcohol sales. Unfortunately, the majority commingled these
separate theories of liability. Then it compounded its error by
applying an inappropriate canon of statutory construction. Finally,
by viewing legislative inaction as proof of its own accuracy, the
majority based its decision on a faulty view of legislative intent. In
doing so, the Minnesota Supreme Court defeats the purpose of
respondeat superior. Rather than letting the superior make
answer, it let the superior off the hook.

not amended section 1983. Id. Justice Scalia asked, should we now “assume that
[Monell’s] interpretation was correct?” Id.
218. Furthermore, vicarious liability is a common-law theory entirely separate
from the CDA, so if the CDA is presumed not to abrogate the common law,
vicarious liability already applies and need not be mentioned expressly in the
statute.
219. Urban v. Am. Legion Dep’t of Minn., 723 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2006)
(quoting Fahrendorff v. N. Homes, Inc., 597 N.W.2d 905, 910 (Minn. 1999)).
220. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1338 (8th ed. 2004).
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